On the Interruption and Suspension of the Prescription of Penal Action

Abstract

The time limits for prescription of a penal action directly provided by the CIC (can. 1362 § 1) and the CCEO (can. 1152 § 2) are rather brief. Moreover, the law does not well define the institutes of the interruption and suspension of prescription of such an action upon beginning the judicial or administrative penal procedure. It follows that the favor rei leads to the conclusion that, in practice, there is no interruption or suspension of prescription apart from the condemnatory decision (judicial or administrative) that has become a res iudicata (or executable). Beyond being surprising, this situation seems unjust, since true delicts can easily remain unpunished because of prescription, which can occur while the process of first or second instance is pending. Such a situation, causing harm to the bonum commune Ecclesiae, can only be modified by the legislator, who could either extend the time limits for prescription of a penal action or clearly establish a rationale for and manner of applying the suspension of prescription.